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Executive Summary  
This research was motivated by the urgent need for global health institutions 
like the World Health Organization and UNITAID to adopted an informed, 
market based approach to engaging with the research and development 
pipeline for drugs that treat children infected with the HIV virus. As the market 
size for these products declines over the next decade, the usual incentives for 
pharmaceutical and biotech companies to invest in the development of new 
drugs and new formulations of existing drugs is likely to dwindle. Innovated 
solutions are needed if a business case is to be made that addresses this 
important public health need.  
 
The objectives of the research include firstly, describing the public health 
need for research and development into paediatric Antiretroviral drugs; 
secondly describing the various stakeholders and their interests; and finally 
exploring and indentifying potential collaborative / partnership opportunities 
that can be employed to address the existing public health need while 
satisfying the various stakeholder interests at play.  
 
The study methods employed included conducting twelve in-depth interviews 
with key informants from the public and private sector. All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed before an iterative content analysis was done to 
categorize themes and issues raised. The data collected was triangulated with 
understanding gained from a literature review that considered 29 peer 
reviewed papers and with data collected from key documents available on the 
webpages of relevant institutions.  
   
Reflecting on the results of this study, the author argues that there is a 
pressing public health need for both new paediatric Antiretrovirals and new 
formulations of existing paediatric Antiretrovirals. The most effective way for 
this public health need to be addressed, however, is through proactively 
engaging the market dynamics that drive research and development for these 
products.  
 Limited market incentives and prohibitive regulatory constraints represent the 
major barriers to investment in this area. Partnership opportunities exist 
however that could make the market for paediatric Antiretrovirals more 
attractive to industry through risk and cost sharing with the public sector. 
Success in the area of product development for TB and malaria suggest that 
these mechanisms are both viable and desirable.  
 
Initiatives whereby the public sector share in the research and development 
costs (by providing capital) and risks (by providing reward incentives and 
advanced market commitments) in exchange for price concessions in place of 
strategic public health importance, could facilitate research and development 
in the area of paediatric Antiretrovirals.   
 
This report recommends that multilateral donor organizations (like UNITAID) 
engage directly with the pharmaceutical industry by creating a Health Impact 
Fund (that rewards industry for changes in health outcomes), Advanced 
Market Commitments (for products of strategic public health importance) and 
work with venture capital firms by providing security for money provided to 
pharmaceutical companies that is invested in research and development for 
paediatric Antiretrovirals.  
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Chapter 1  Problem in context / Orientation 
1.1 Introduction 
Infants who contract HIV during the birth process or breastfeeding are no 
longer necessarily condemned to die. Medicines in the form of Antiretrovirals 
(ARVs) that can prolong their lives into adulthood are available. The 
emergency of resistant strains of HIV and the various constraints that exist 
when treating a child (the need for liquid formulations for very young children 
for example) means that ongoing research and development (R&D) of 
paediatric ARVs is extremely important if the millions of children who are 
currently HIV positive are to be effectively treated.  
 
Market incentives for the pharmaceutical industry to invest in ongoing R&D in 
this area are weak and dwindling. This is partly due to the fact that most HIV 
positive children live in poor countries where large profit margins are not 
feasible. Added to this, the World Health Organization (WHO) together with 
UNICEF have committed to “virtual elimination” of Mother to Child 
Transmission (MTCT) of HIV by the year 2015. While this is a laudable 
endeavor, it does mean that the market size for paediatric ARVs is set to 
become significantly small over the next decade, which further erodes the 
prospect of future returns on investments in R&D in this area.  
 
Given this imperative this research project explores the institutional and 
economic landscape of R&D into paediatric ARVs with a view to identifying 
partnership opportunities between pharmaceutical companies and global 
health institutions like the World Health Organization and UNITAID that 
address the R&D pipeline for these products.  
 
1.2 Problem in Context / Orientation 
An estimated 2.5 million children are living with HIV of which 2.3 million are in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Approximately 1,000 children are infected with HIV every 
day, mostly during childbirth and breastfeeding. Of those infected, only about 
360,000 are currently being treated - although this number is up from 75,000 
in 2005 (WHO, 2011). The World Health Organization has set the goal of 
virtually eliminating mother to child transmission globally by the year 2015 by 
providing medicines for HIV positive pregnant women that prevents the 
transmission of the virus. While the decline in the incidence of new HIV cases 
in children is laudable, it does have implications for the market incentives that 
drive R&D in the pharmaceutical industry. As fewer children have HIV, the 
development of appropriate treatments for those that do could become less 
and less.  
 
The issue of drug development for people in poor countries is subject to the 
business reality of the pharmaceutical industry and the incentives that drive its 
R&D agenda. Between 1975 and 1999, out of 1,393 new drugs developed, 
only 13 (less than 1%) were designed to treat tropical diseases, which 
account for more than 90% of the world’s disease burden.  More emphatically, 
only 10% of the USD 70 billion spent on health research worldwide each year 
is for research into health problems that affect 90% of the world population - 
the 90/10 gap (Hale et al. 2005). These facts highlight the dramatic mismatch 
between global resource expenditure and public health needs in poor 
countries.  
 
This problem is compounded by poor market characterization, poor demand 
forecasting, prohibitive regulatory constraints and intellectual property rights 
(IPR) issues that make the development of these products unattractive from a 
commercial point of view. By exploring similar R&D problems for other 
“neglected tropical diseases” and by understanding the various incentives that 
drive the respective stakeholders (public and private), potential partnerships 
and collaborative opportunities may exist that allow for scenarios that are both 
profitable to pharmaceutical companies and meet important public health 
needs in this area.  
 
Buse and Harmer (2007) describe Global Health Partnerships as 
“collaborative relationships among pharmaceutical companies in partnership 
with UN-based organizations, developing country governments and public and 
private foundations to ensure efficient product development, healthcare 
delivery and technical support for implementation of national disease 
programmes” (Kent Buse & Harmer 2007) 
1.3 Problem review 
In order for global health institutions like the WHO to work towards their 
strategic objective of ensuring access to life saving drugs for children in the 
world poorest areas, they need to engage the complexity of a disparate set of 
stakeholders with varying interests and objectives. The complexity of this 
problem can be thought of as existing within three interrelated domains:  
1. understanding the unmet public health need (demand)  
2. understanding the various stakeholder interests (supply)  
3. identifying opportunities for partnerships and collaborative initiatives 
that align public health needs (demand) with stakeholder interests 
(supply).  
 
Figure 1.1. below illustrates these three domains of complexity and represents 
a framework for unpacking the problem in greater detail.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Framework for considering R&D of paediatric ARVs 
 
Relevant constructs:  
Public health need: a starting point for any initiative aimed an improving the 
availability of paediatric drugs in poor countries must be to understand the 
existing ‘unmet’ need globally. The demand for these products should be 
described in terms of its magnitude at a point in time, but rather in terms of the 
needs that will emerge over the coming decade. Due to lack of infrastructure 
and sophisticated health information systems, demand forecasting for these 
products is currently extremely weak in poor countries.  
 
Stakeholder interests: pharmaceutical companies, public research 
organizations, multilateral donor agencies and global health institutes have 
distinct but not mutually exclusive strategic objectives. While the private 
sector needs to ensure that it maximizes its shareholder value, public 
institutions want to ensure access to lifesaving treatment for as many children 
as possible.  
 
Partnership logic: opportunities for risk and cost sharing in exchange for 
price and market concessions have been used to promote the development of 
treatments for neglected diseases in the past. This report will consider such 
collaborative opportunities in the area of paediatric ARVs.  
 
1.4 Problem statement 
Medical interventions in the developing communities are dogged by a number 
of issues not least of which are basic business realities. One is therefore often 
faced with business reality vs medical need paradox and it is this paradox that 
is at the center of this research.  
 
This research explores the institutional and economic landscape of R&D with 
a view to identifying partnership opportunities between pharmaceutical 
companies global health institutions like the World Health Organization and 
UNITAID that address the Research and Development pipeline for paediatric 
Antiretroviral medications.  
 
The thesis postulated here is: 
The current institutional and economic landscape of R&D needs partnership 
opportunities between pharmaceutical companies and global health 
institutions like the World Health Organization and UNITAID that address the 
Research and Development pipeline for paediatric Antiretroviral medications 
 1.5 Objectives 
Objective 1 – public health need 
To characterize the market place for paediatric ARVs including what products 
are needed and why it is that the demand for these products is likely to 
change over the next decade.  
 
Objective 2 – stakeholder interests 
To identify the various stakeholders, both in the global health arena and the 
private sector and identify their interests and strategic objectives.  
 
Objective 3 – partnership logic  
To explore opportunities for collaboration and partnership between the various 
actors so as to meet both the public health need and the various stakeholder 
interest indentified though [1] and [2] above.  
 
1.6 Importance of the research 
Organizations like the World Health Organization and UNITAID that have a 
public health mandate cannot achieve their goals without working closely with 
the private sector. By looking at a public health objective (in this case, 
ensuring access to life saving medicines for children in poor countries) 
through the lenses of business science research enables all stakeholders to 
make informed (evidence based) decisions as to how their strategic objectives 
can be met.  
 
Importantly, this research seeks to describe and understand the R&D 
landscape, which in turn should provide a platform upon which innovative 
solutions can be explored. The importance of this research lies in the 
implications for both children living with HIV and for organizations (public and 
private) seeking to find ‘win-win’ collaborative opportunities.  
 
1.7 Assumptions  
The conclusions and recommendations of this research makes the 
assumptions that firstly, the political will exists within large public health 
institutions like the World Health Organization to engage more proactively with 
the private sector and secondly that the private sector are willing to explore 
innovative partnership arrangements that serve a public health agenda. Each 
of the stakeholders act within a complex landscape of political and economic 
realities. Broad buy-in from a disparate array of decision makers is necessary 
if any meaningful collaborative initiatives are to be engaged. 
1.8 Delimitations (scope)  
This research explores the nature of existing and potential partnerships and 
collaborative opportunities in the area of paediatric ARVs. It seeks to 
understand the political and economic landscape within which decisions get 
made and draws inference as to what additional opportunities might exist that 
have as yet not been exploited in realm.  
1.9 Limitations  
This research does not unpack the complexities of internal political and 
organizational structural issues that contribute towards individual organization 
decisions making as it pertains to partnership creation. The research method 
also has limitations that are described in more detail in chapter 4.  
1.10 Overview of the report 
Chapter 1.  Problem in context: This chapter describes the objectives of this 
research in the context of background and overall context in which the 
paediatric ARV crisis exists.  
Chapter 2. Problem analysis / Theoretical considerations: This chapter 
makes the link between the research question under consideration and 
existing business science, in particular market dynamics and stakeholder 
power.  
Chapter 3. Literature review: This chapter identifies the existing body of 
knowledge that has been published in the areas of the need for paediatric 
ARVs, stakeholder interests and partnership logic. It represents a platform 
from which well informed data collection could take place and is in-and-of 
itself an important source of information that contributes towards the broader 
analysis done in this research 
Chapter 4. Research design and methods: This chapter outlines the 
research design and scientific methods applied in such a way as to make the 
data collection both repeatable and reliable as far as possible.  
Chapter 5. Results and discussion: This chapter lays out the results of the 
data collection and explores the relationship between the data and the 
research objectives.  
Chapter 6. Conclusions and Recommendations: This chapter reflects on 
the data and considers the potential implications therein. It also makes 
recommendations.  
Chapter 7. Reference 
Appendices  
1.11 Summary of chapter 1  
Chapter 1 has provided a description of the problem that this research seeks 
to unpack and explore. The need for ongoing R&D in the area of paediatric 
ARVs is essential if the millions of children with HIV are to be effectively 
treated. Market incentives for industry to invest in this kind of research is 
limited and the need for innovative collaborative initiatives between the public 
and private sector are needed if this agenda is to be pursued.  
 
The objectives of the research include firstly, understanding and describing 
the public health need for R&D into paediatric ARVs; secondly understanding 
and describing the various stakeholders and their interests; and finally 
exploring and indentifying potential collaborative / partnership opportunities 
that can be employed to address the existing public health need while 
satisfying the various stakeholder interests at play.  
 
Chapter 1 concludes by highlighting that the importance of this research lies 
in the potential for win-win opportunities but states the caveat that these 
opportunities can only be exploited if the willingness to engage them exists 
within the current political and economic environment.  
Chapter 2 Problem analysis / Theoretical considerations 
2.1 Introduction 
A broad viewpoint of the major issues relevant to this research has been 
depicted in Chapter 1 above. In order to provide context to the discussion on 
this subject it is important to consider two important tenants of business 
theory, i.e. market dynamics and stakeholder power. Chapter 2 will outline two 
important aspects of business theory that underpin and inform the data 
collection and analysis.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Consideration 1: Market dynamics   
The economist Milton Friedman stated that “the business of business is 
business” (Friedman 1962). Supporting this, Sloan states that “the strategic 
aim of a business is to earn a return on capital” (Sloan et al. 1998). Many 
have argued that there is a moral and economic imperative for managers to 
focus on profit maximization (Minford 1998) (Grant 2001) (Porter 2004).  
 
These positions are counterbalanced by Drucker: “So we should think 
through what management should be accountable for; and how and 
through whom its accountability can be discharged. The stockholders 
interest, both short and long term is one of the areas. But it is only one.”   
(Drucker 1988) 
 
Within the current paradigm of capitalism and free markets, the private sector 
is largely left to follow its own interest with the understanding that good and 
services are efficiently provided for in the right quantity and at a price that is 
agreeable to the consumer. Public sector intervention is only called for where 
market mechanisms fail act in the interest of the public at large. Adam Smith 
(1776) in “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” 
describes how the invisible hand of the market leads to an efficient quantity 
and price equilibrium as a function of supply (the marginal cost of production) 
and demand (the marginal benefit of consumption) - see figure 2.1. Below 
(Smith, 1776) 
 
Understanding the theoretic considerations that lead to this equilibrium is 
useful in the context of addressing market failure. Various parameters 
relevant to this research problem will be unraveled here. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Market dynamics – a normative model  
 
While a detailed discussion on the market dynamics for drugs in low income 
countries is beyond the scope of this report, in order to provide context for the 
particular area of interest to this study, it is worth considering briefly how it is 
that this normative model applies in this area. Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. below 
show how a normative demand curve for drugs in developing countries is 
relatively ‘L’ shaped and that with the intervention of multilateral donor 
agencies like UNITAID who provide finance for drugs with a view to making 
them more accessible, the demand curve is stretched out and becomes more 
linear.  
 
Figure 2.2. Market dynamics for drugs in low-income countries 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.. Price elasticity for drugs in low-income countries 
 
Figure 2.4. Changes in market dynamics with donor intervention 
 
Various conditions need to be met in order for markets to work efficiently. In 
the absence of these conditions, markets are set to fail (that is, price fails to 
approximate value). These conditions include:  
1. Many buyers 
2. Many sellers 
3. No barrier to entry for new suppliers  
4. No barrier to exist for existing suppliers  
5. Information efficiency  
6. No “externalities” (costs and benefits not incurred by the participants in 
a given transaction)  
7. No public goods (non-rival, non excludable goods) 
  
In the case of the market for paediatric ARVs, the conditions above are not 
met and the possibility for market failure therefore exists. There are relatively 
few supply companies (especially in niche pharmaceutical areas like 
paediatric ARVs), there are few buyers (The Clinton Foundation using funding 
from UNITAID buys more than 80% of the global paediatric ARVs supply), 
there are significant barriers to entry into the market (the WTO TRIPS 
agreements ensures patent protection for at least 20 years), there is poor 
information efficiency (due to a lack of information systems allowing for 
demand forecasting in poor countries) and there are important social 
externalities associated with keeping children alive. These are just a few of 
the factors that mitigate against traditional market forces being an adequate 
mechanism for the supply of paediatric ARVs. \ 
 
2.3 Theoretical Consideration 2: Stakeholder Power 
Gardner and Rechlin (1986) describe how stakeholders can be mapped by 
considering their relative power against their relative levels of interest 
(Gardner & Rachlin 1986) - see figure 2.5 below.  
 
 
Figure 2.5. Stakeholder power and interest 
 
The application of the underlying theoretical considerations of this model can 
be thought of in the context of the pharmaceutical industry and their relative 
‘power’ (capacity to influence and engage in the R&D of paediatric ARVs) and 
their level of interest in doing so (the extent to which they consider the market 
for these products to be an attractive area for investment).  
 
Pearce and Robinson list groups of stakeholders including: shareholders, 
employees, customers, suppliers, governments, unions, competitors, local 
communities and the general public (Pearce 2008). However for the purposes 
of this research project, we will use Freemans definition of the stakeholder, 
“any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the organization’s objective” (Freeman 2010a).  
 
Winstanley et. al. proposed a model through which managers can understand 
where it is that stakeholders might exercise power (Winstanley et al. 1995). 
They argued that power can be applied in two distinct ways:  
1. Critical power – the power to define the goals, aims and purpose of the 
organization 
2. Operational power – the power to determine how the product or service 
offered by the company is provided by the allocation of a range of 
resources.  
 
Agle et. al. propose a more recent model in which stakeholder behavior is 
grouped into various types, depending on the combination of three 
characteristics (Agle et al. 1999): 
1. POWER of the stakeholder to influence the organization.  
2. LEGITIMACY of the relationship and actions of the stakeholder with the 
organization in terms of desirability, properness or appropriateness. 
3. URGENCY of the requirements being set for the organization by a 
stakeholder in terms of criticality and time-sensitivity for the 
stakeholder.  
 
All three models are useful tools in considering the relative power of 
interested stakeholders and their respective objectives. Chapter 5 includes a 
“stakeholder map” and highlights the involvement of the state, the private 
sector and global health institutions, all of which have different levels of power 
and legitimacy when it comes to critical decisions that are made with regard to 
the nature and type of collaborative initiatives undertaken in the area of drug 
development.  
2.4 Summary  
Chapter 2 has explored some of the economic and social realities that R&D 
for paediatric ARVs exists within. Within the free market system that 
predominates, companies meet the demand for goods and services at a price 
and in quantities that are appropriate to their costs and need to generate a 
profit.  
 
The supply and demand model can be used to understand the market for 
medicines in poor countries in general (which apply to paediatric ARVs). The 
intervention of multilateral donor agencies (like UNITAID) who provide 
financing for the procurement of drugs have the effect of straightening out the 
‘demand’ curve and increasing access to medicines in poor countries. The 
importance of this model with respect to R&D for paediatric ARVs is revisited 
in chapter 6 (Conclusions and Recommendations).  
 
A second theoretical consideration is stakeholder power. In the context of 
partnerships and collaborative initiatives, the relative power and interest of the 
various stakeholders will determine the nature and effectiveness of the 
partnership.  
 
While market dynamics and stakeholder power are not themselves the subject 
of this investigation, they are however essential concepts that must be 
integrated into the analysis of the data collected in this study.  
Chapter 3 Literature review 
3.1 Introduction 
The theoretical considerations underlying some of the key issues related to 
this study have been opened up in chapter 2. Chapter 2 has moreover, 
allowed the unraveling of much of the complexity relevant to the practical or 
business issues addressed by this research thus establishing a business case 
for the research. 
 
The purpose of this literature review is to consider, with respect to the three 
stated objectives established in chapter 1 above, what work has already been 
done and what body of knowledge has already been established. By 
establishing such a baseline, the author has been able to make informed 
decisions as to what line of questioning to follow when interviewing the 
participants of the study.  
 
While the primary data for this study has been collected through in-depth key 
informant interviews, the literature review should be considered to be an 
important part of the overall dataset and indeed a platform of knowledge upon 
which the final data analysis has taken place.  
 
This literature review considers four key ideas:  
1. Public health need for paediatric ARVs  
2. Stakeholder interests in the area of paediatric ARV supply  
3. Partnership logic between public and private entities  
4. Stakeholder power  
 
Search engines and online databases used for this study included:  
1. EMBASE 
2. CINAHL 
3. The Cochrane library 
4. MEDLINE 
5. Google Scholar  
 
The Boolean search terms entered into databases include: 
(Public private partnerships OR partnerships for product development OR 
PPPs OR global health partnerships) AND (product development OR drug 
development OR R&D OR research and development OR pharmaceutical OR 
stakeholder interest AND underserved markets OR market failure OR drugs 
for neglected disease) AND (HIV OR Paediatric HIV OR Paediatric ARVs OR 
Pediatric ARVs OR ARVs)  
 
Refining the list of potentially relevant manuscripts was done through a 
process illustrated in figure 3.1 below.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Literature review process 
 
Each of the 29 papers was read with a view to extracting relevant information 
and understanding in the four areas of interest. Key ideas were extracted and 
then compiled under the headings of: public health need, stakeholder interest, 
partnership logic and stakeholder power.  
 
The literature review produced the following results:  
3.2 Public health needs 
The clinical imperative to address the issue of developing formulations for 
children are highlighted by studies that show that when ARVs are used on 
HIV infected children: 
 73% survival at 24 months for children with <5% CD41 cells vs 98% in 
children with >5% CD4 cells (Fassinou et al. 2004) 
 After 756 days on ARVs, 50% of children had undetectable viral loads2 
(Fassinou et al. 2004) 
 The median CD4 cell% of children on ARVs rose from 3% to 21% at 72 
weeks (Puthanakit et al. 2005) 
 75% of patients had HIV RNA3 levels of < 50 copies /ml at 72 weeks 
(Puthanakit et al. 2005) 
 
In discussing the need for industry to engage more proactively with the public 
health needs in Africa, Scheffler (2005a) brings home the message  that in 
2001 the major items on the global R&D agenda included CNS disorders 
(26%) Cancer, Endocrine and Metabolic disease (22%) and cardiovascular 
(18%). Spending on research on developing an HIV vaccine accounted for 
less than 1% of global R&D (Scheffler & Pathania 2005a).  
 
Dionisio (2006) points to fact that a major limitation that many Africa countries 
face in pharmaceutical production is lack of capacity and infrastructure in the 
manufacturing process required to produce quality drugs. He points out that in 
Africa, the generic pharmaceutical industry requires: 
1. Increased availability of trained human resources for quality 
manufacturing 
2. Greater depth of expertise in multilevel Standard Operating Procedures 
for quality manufacturing 
3. Higher levels of quality manufacturing and analytical technologies 
                                                        
1 CD4 cells are part of the immune system. A CD4 count is a measure of the patients ability to mount an 
immune response. AS the disease progresses, the CD4 count falls.  
2 Viral load is a measure of the actual number of HIV viruses that can be counted in a milliliter of blood. Like 
CD4 count, this is a measure of the progress of the disease. A higher viral load represents a poorer 
prognostic sign for the patient.  
3 The HIV RNA gives an indication of the viral load in the patient.  
4. Improved local sourcing of raw or semi-finished materials, with tariff 
barriers eliminated for importation 
5. Enhanced capabilities for local chemistry synthesis procedures 
6. Improved quality monitoring skills at National Drug Regulatory 
Authorities 
7. Greater government incentives 
8. Improved access to ample donor support 
 
Dionisio et. al. goes on to highlight the fact that only one third of sub-Saharan 
African countries have capacities for secondary manufacturing. Very often 
when they do have capacities, they are not in full Good Manufacturing 
Practice (GMP) compliance (Dionisio et al. 2006).  While this point represents 
a problem that needs to be addressed within the context of a wider discussion 
on economic development across multiple sectors (not just healthcare 
products), it is nevertheless of interest as national capacity in this area 
translates directly into increased access to essential medicines.  
 
Factors that have lead to under investment in R&D for diseases in poor 
countries are listed by Wheeler and Berkley (2001a) and include:  
1. Perceived and actual low market returns for these investments 
2. Distribution challenges in poor countries 
3. Lack of awareness / understanding of the public health needs in poor 
countries (Wheeler & Berkley 2001a) 
 
The point made by Wheeler and Berkley should be seen as an extension of 
the problem highlighted by Dionisio et. al. in that national capacity in the area 
of drug development needs to be complemented by an ability to ensure that 
those drugs are effectively distributed within that country.  
 
Expanding on the problem of access to medicines in poor countries Heywood 
(2002) lists the major barriers to access in Africa as: 
1. Rising disease pandemics,  
2. The high prices of patent-protected drugs,  
3. Poverty,  
4. Infrastructure and  
5. Political will (Heywood 2002) 
 
While the issue of manufacture and distribution of drugs is paramount to this 
inquiry, the fundamental problem of new drug development must be 
addressed. Pecoul (2004) points to three gaps in the R&D pipeline for 
medicines for underserved markets: 
Discovery 
Gap 1 – Basic research is published but preclinical research in not 
considered worthwhile 
Predevelopment 
Gap 2 – Validated candidate drugs don’t enter the clinical development 
stage because of profit-based company choices 
Development 
Gap 3 – Drugs never reach the patent due to registration problems, lack of 
production, high prices or drugs poorly adapted to local conditions. 
Availability to patient (Pécoul 2004) 
 
The importance of “access” to healthcare products must distinguish between 
“potential access” (the presence of healthcare) and “realized access” (the 
actual use of healthcare services) (R M Andersen 1995). Thind and Andersen 
(2003) sate that potential access is a function of availability and accessibility; 
for example the rural urban differential and the time to reach a health facility 
(Thind & Ronald Andersen 2003) 
 
3.3 Stakeholder interests 
According to Freeman et. al. (2010b) Stakeholder Value Perspective the very 
purpose of a firm is to coordinate the various interests of the stakeholders 
(Freeman 2010b).  
 
Exploring the idea of “stakeholder interest” Charls Handy (2002) makes 
reference to the ‘enlightened business’ that recognizes that it is possible to 
make money and do some good at the same time (Handy 2002). Goodpaster 
(1988) suggests that an organizations mission statement should be the 
product of negotiation with the various concerns of stakeholders (Goodpaster 
1988).  
 
Importantly, for profit companies are not the only organizations that engage in 
R&D. Hale (2005) explores the concept of “nonprofit pharmaceutical 
companies” that have R&D capacity and are driven by public health needs 
and not financial remuneration per se (Hale et al. 2005). Added to this, non 
fiscal incentives for pharmaceutical companies to engage in R&D partnerships 
represent an additional mechanism through which R&D can take place. These 
incentives are listed by Wheeler and Berkley and include:  
1. Access to knowledge 
2. Access to platform technologies that allow for the development of other 
drugs 
3. Competitive advantage 
4. Access to markets (Wheeler & Berkley 2001b) 
 
Examples of existing partnership are explored in the literature and include 
work done by Lim (2005) which shows that in Singapore’s health sector, the 
private sector was incentivized to engage in partnerships with the public 
sector by the prospect of being able to access international markets for 
healthcare (Lim 2005).   
 
Initiative within the private sector that have altruistic as well as profit motives  
are looked at by authors such as Vian et. al. who published a study that 
looked at Pfizer’s Global Health Fellows programme that worked with health 
organizations in low income countries in an effort to improving staff 
performance with those organizations (Vian et al. n.d.). In this example, the 
public sector were seeking to improve human capacity while Pfizer 
categorized this as one of their ‘corporate philanthropy programmes. Of 
interest is the extent to which Pfizer was incentivized by altruism or, 
alternatively, the desire to make working for them more attractive (clearly the 
72 members of staff that took part would have been interested in this 
opportunity).  
 
In addressing the problem of the development of new paediatric ARVs it is 
important to consider similar work done in addressing problems in other 
disease areas. Njau et. al. (2009) conducted a study into public private 
partnerships in Tanzania that were aimed at malaria control. Their study found 
that the process was driven largely by stakeholders that had common vision 
and the involvement of senior politicians in the process (Njau et al. 2009).  
 
3.4 Partnership logic   
Global Health Partnerships are described by Buse and Harmer (2007) as: 
 “…collaborative relationships among pharmaceutical 
companies in partnership with UN-based organizations, 
developing country governments and public and private 
foundations to ensure efficient product development, healthcare 
delivery and technical support for implementation of national 
disease programmes” (Kent Buse & Harmer 2007) 
 
Pointing to the fact that, partnerships with the private sector have emerged 
out of necessity, Nishtar (2004)  shows that this necessity is a function of the 
failure of the public sector to provide adequate public health facilities on their 
own (Nishtar 2004).  
 
Karki et. al. (2007) point to the dramatic effect that public private partnerships 
have had on TB control in Nepal. They point out that while PPP schemes had 
a low additional cost, the case notification rate was more than doubled (Karki 
et al. 2007) 
 
Hypothetical options for collaboration between the pharmaceutical industry 
and the public sector are explored by Scheffler and Pathania (2005a) who 
argue that this represents an opportunity to increase the availability of drugs 
in the developing world. This addresses the need for the pharmaceutical 
industry to have their IP protected and to generate a profit and balance it with 
the human right to life and health (Scheffler & Pathania 2005b).  
 
Reasons why pharmaceutical companies might take an interest in Global 
Health Partnership are listed by Scheffler:  
1. In some cases they get to retain the property rights of new medicines 
(subject to their commitment to sell the product at marginal cost in 
developing countries) 
2. Spin off benefits of the R&D done. New knowledge gleaned can be 
used in the development of other products 
3. Companies gain an understanding of and access to new markets 
4. Small biotech firms can get into the spotlight and gain visibility leading 
to more funding and potentially bigger orders 
5. Project themselves as good corporate citizens (Scheffler & Pathania 
2005a).  
 
Wheeler and Berkley (2001b) describe the characteristics of Product 
Development Partnerships (a class of PPP) as:  
1. Small and effective management teams that coordinate project 
selection and portfolio management, low overheads and operational 
flexibility  
2. Disease specific focus  
3. Funding from public and philanthropic sectors with in-kind contributions 
from the private sector through project partnerships 
4. Funding of projects that have a commercial component to them as well 
as a well defined public health objective  
5. Decision-making typically lies with partnership management who have 
retroactive accountability to the Board and other stakeholders. This 
allows for project initiation, termination and adjustment without 
complicated and cumbersome approval mechanisms  
6. Clear recognition of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) (Wheeler & 
Berkley 2001b) 
 
In a two part series, Buse and Walt  (2000a) consider firstly the generic 
factors that have driven the emergency of public private partnerships in the 
global health arena (K Buse & Walt 2000a) and secondly whether or not 
shared goals can transcend conflicting values and mandates. The series 
concludes that the current climate of goodwill between the public and private 
sectors offers an opportunity that should not be missed (K Buse & Walt 
2000b).  
 
A study into the cost savings associated with the building of hospitals through 
public private partnerships was published by McKee in an effort to consider 
the cost effectiveness of such endeavors (McKee et al. 2006).  While cost is 
clearly an important issue in the public sector, McKee points to the fact that 
there is evidence that quality was compromised and that due to the 
complexity associated with these kinds of projects, it becomes increasing 
difficult to ‘future proof’ them.  
 
Other examples in the literature include that published by Lim (2005) which 
examines public private partnership in Singapore and shows how through 
partnerships an increase in flexibility has allowed Singapore to become a 
regional hub in terms of health care provision. (Lim 2005).  
 
Krupp et. al. (2009) examine maternal mortality in India and compare and 
contrast various strategies that are being undertaken to address the human 
resource shortage that contributes significantly to the problem. They ask 
whether public private partnership should be scaled up instead of increasing 
public sector health systems (Krupp & Madhivanan 2009). They conclude that 
a combination of public sector enhancement and private sector involvement is 
appropriate.  
 
3.5 Summary  
The literature review starts by establishing the clinical effectiveness of ARVs 
for use in children. It goes on to highlight the dearth in investment into R&D 
for ‘neglected tropical disease’ in general and the need for developing 
countries to establish domestic R&D and production capabilities of their own.  
 
Factors that are listed as contributory to the lack of R&D in this area include: 
1) low returns on investment, 2) poor distribution channels in poor countries, 
3) lack of awareness of the demand for these products.  
 
The literature highlights the need for a common vision among stakeholders if 
partnerships are to be established to address the R&D pipeline. While 
companies are primarily driven by profit incentives, examples exist of 
companies engaging in partnerships out of a sense of corporate social 
responsibility and for other non-fiscal benefits include: 1) access to platform 
technologies, 2) competitive advantage through improved access to markets 
in poor countries 3) improved public relations.  
 
The literature points to the fact that partnerships are needed because of a 
failure of public institutes to adequately provide healthcare facilities and 
medicines on their own. The logic of partnerships lies in the potential to 
balance the right to life with the possibility for companies to make a profit.  
 
Shortfalls in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are described, in particular a 
concern with a problem of ‘quality’. Where PPPs have been shown to be 
successful however, the literature states the importance o scaling these 
initiatives up.  
 
The importance of PPPs in the health sector is emphasized and the 
establishment of new PPPs in the area is suggested.  
 
Chapter 4 Research design and methods 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters have outlined the research objectives of interest, 
outlined some of the theoretical issues that underpin those objectives and 
explored the literature to establish a baseline of knowledge with respect to 
those objectives. This chapter considers the theoretical and practical aspects 
of the research methods employed to ensure that the research objectives 
stated in chapter 1 were met in a logical and repeatable way.  
 
4.2 Study design  
Cooper and Schindler  (2008) define research design as  
1. an activity,  
2. based on a research question,  
3. guides the selection of sources of data,  
4. is a framework for specifying relationships between variables and 
5. outlines procedures for every research activity.  (Cooper and Schindler 
2008). 
  
The study design described below is based on the framework described by 
Cooper and Shindler (2008) and clearly delineates the type of study being 
undertaken, how it is that the data for the study was collected, the identified 
population of interest, the sample size and sampling process before going on 
to describe the method of analysis, limitation of the study and ethical 
considerations.  
4.2.1 Study type:  
Martins et. al (1996) describe qualitative research as the collection of data 
from a large number of people with the intention of projecting the results to a 
wider population (Martins et al. 1996). This is a weak definition of qualitative 
research in that it assumes that the investigation falls under the aegis of 
‘social science’ and that the subjects are human. For the purposes of this 
study however, it is nevertheless appropriate.  
 
Importantly qualitative research collects data that is not primarily numerical. A 
common misconception is that the analysis of qualitative data is never 
statistical. This is not necessarily true as following the coding of qualitative 
data, statistical analysis is often possible and appropriate. As is suggested by 
the word itself however, qualitative research attempts to unpack and 
understand qualities (and not magnitudes) associated with the subject of 
interest (Sandelowski 2000).  
 
This study is a qualitative investigation drawing on data collected though a series of 
in depth interviews and complimented with information and understanding gathered 
though a narrative literature review of peer reviewed articles on the subject matter of 
interest and a review of key documents available on the WebPages of institutions of 
interest.  
 
4.2.2 Data collection  
“In-depth interviews: face to face conversation with the purpose of exploring 
issues or topics in detail. Does not use pre-set questions, but is shaped by a 
defined set of topics or issues” (Pope & Mays 1995) 
 
Interviews were held in person or done over the phone/skype. All interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. Given the diversity of ideas and opinions that 
emerged, pre-coded questions were not used.  A semi-structured interview 
allowed the interviewer to dig deep on issues that arose. A detailed 
description of the Interview Protocol is provided in Appendix 2 below.  
 
Importantly, the preceding literature review allowed the author to build upon 
existing ideas and generate informed questions into the subject matter as the 
interviews proceeded.  
 
4.2.3 Population of interest 
The population of interest in any given study is the entire group about which 
the sample selected is expected to represent. Most studies do not examine 
the entire population but rather try to identify a representative sample that 
captures the important elements of the population (Sandelowski 2000).  
 
In this study, the population of interest includes all decision makers that have 
experience in driving public / private cooperative initiatives in the area of drug 
development for diseases in underserved markets. These include representatives 
from the private sector (pharma / biotech), global health institutions (WHO, 
UNITAID and the Medicines Patent Pool) and clinical experts in the field.   
 
4.2.4 Sampling process 
A small focused sample has been chosen using a ‘snow-ball’ technique. A 
snow-ball technique involves starting with a small group of known and willing 
participants and using the interview process itself to identify further candidate 
participants. A letter sent to interviewees asking them to participate in the 
study has been included as Appendix 1 below.  
 
Inclusion criteria included  
1. Knowledge of the subject of interest 
2. Experience at a senior management level  
Exclusion criteria included:  
1. Known conflicts of interest 
2. Lack of willingness to participate in the study 
 
4.2.5 Sample size  
A sample of 12 participants has been used. 
4.3 Analysis  
4.3.1 Method for data coding and classification  
Pope and Mays (1995) described the process of “content analysis” as one in 
which qualitative data is examined and grouped into themes, categories and 
attributed codes.  The process of content analysis should be complimented by 
“constant comparison” which is an iterative method in which as a new 
idea/code/category is identified, it is then searched for throughout the entire 
data set. All instances are compared until no new categories can be identified 
(Pope & Mays 1995).  
 
All of the interviews conducted in this study were recorded and then 
transcribed. The author then undertook to read through all of transcripts of the 
interviews and through the literature review and group the emerging ideas and 
concepts in an iterative fashion as described by Pope and May (1995). As the 
Interview Protocol (see Appendix 2) allowed for the interview process itself to 
collect information under the headings of the three study objectives, data fell 
naturally into categories consistent with those objectives and are described in 
the results section of this report under the relevant headings.  
 
4.3.2 Study validity and reliability  
Cook and Campbell (1979) define validity as the "best available 
approximation to the truth or falsity of a given inference, proposition or 
conclusion." (Cook & Campbell 1979). Pope and Mays (1995) describe 
validity as the extent to which measurements truly reflect the phenomenon 
under scrutiny (Pope & Mays 1995). A study’s validity is a function of sound 
study design and investigator integrity. Pope and Mays (1995) describe 
reliability as the extent to which a study, if repeated will yield the same results 
every time (Pope & Mays 1995).   
 
The authors has made every effort to conduct the research in a manner 
consistent with the described study design and to, where possible, eliminate 
sources of bias and/or error from the data collection and analytic process. 
Ultimately, study validity rests heavily on the integrity of the investigator. In 
this case, the author has focused on engaging in an honest enquiry into the 
facts surrounding the study objective.  
 
4.3.3 Triangulation  
Cohen and Lawrence (2007) define triangulation as an "attempt to map out, or 
explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behavior by studying 
it from more than one standpoint." (Cohen and Lawrence 2007). Bogdan and 
Biklen (2006) describe triangulation as a technique that allows for the 
validation of data through cross verification from more than two sources. They 
particularly advocate the use of more than two research methodology 
(Bogdan & Biklen 2006).  Altrichter (1993) contend that triangulation "gives a 
more detailed and balanced picture of the situation." (Altrichter 1993). Denzin 
(2006) identifies four basic types of triangulation (data, investigator, theory 
and methodological triangulation)  (Denzin 2006).  
 
This study uses three methods of data collection, i.e. the literature review of 
peer reviewed articles, a review of the WebPages and institutional documents 
from organizations of interest and in-depth interviews. These three sets of 
data have been used to inform and understand each other and so build a 
more complete picture. 
 
4.4 Limitations  
The Hawthorne effect is the impact that the research process itself has on the 
data obtained from the subjects being interviewed (or observed). Knowledge 
of a study has the effect of changing people’s behavior (Pope & Mays 1995) 
and may represent a source of bias.  
 
Limitations that have been encountered in this study include:  
 Due to time and resource constraints, a limited sample of stakeholders 
were interviewed.  
 The sample used may not be fully representative of the population of 
interest in that a) the starting point for sample section was thought 
identifying known (to the author) potential participants and b) the snow-
ball technique has a tendency to select other ‘like minded’ participants.  
 The interviewer might have had a set of expected conclusions or 
outcomes of the study that affect his analysis  
 The full array of types of organizations that engage in public private 
partnerships were not evaluated  
 Participant interviewees may have provided information that is 
consistent with their own agenda  
 Interviewees were relying on their memories of events which may at 
times be poor 
 The fact that the data collected was not categorized by predefined 
codes means that an element of bias could have creep in during the 
analysis phase.  
 As mentioned above, the Hawthorne effect impacts on the way that 
interviewees respond to questions being asked.  
 
4.5 Ethical considerations  
Each participant has given their express permission for the information that 
has been provided to be included in this study. Each participant was sent a 
letter (see Appendix 1) that explained the nature of the study in advance of 
the interview process. As described in the Interview Protocol (see Appendix 
2), participants were assured that particular statements would not be directly 
attributed to individual interviewees unless explicit permission to do so was 
granted.  
 
The ethical considerations for this study were given considerable attention 
given the serious nature of the subject matter (medical / public health). As the 
results of the study have the potential to impact policies that affect the health 
of some of the world most vulnerable population groups, every effort was 
made to ensure that in both the data collection and in the analysis of the data, 
nothing was done or said that might negatively impact on existing plans or 
mechanisms to develop paediatric ARVs.  
 
4.6 Summary  
This study is a qualitative investigation based upon a clearly defined set of 
objectives. The study draws on three sources of data, namely: a review of the 
peer reviewed literature; information taken from webpage and documents of 
key stakeholders; and key informant interviews with 12 experts.  
 
The population from which the sample of 12 experts was taken is the set of 
individuals with special knowledge of the R&D pipeline for paediatric ARVs 
and knowledge and experience in the area of Public Private Partnerships. 
Sampling was done using the snow-ball sampling technique and the list of 
participants is described in the results section of this report. Interviewees were 
all sent a letter in advance of the study (see Appendix 1) explaining the nature 
and objectives of the study.  
 
Data was collected by conducting semi-structured interviews that were 
recorded and then transcribed. An Interview Protocol is available as Appendix 
2 below. This data analyses used the ‘constant comparison’ and ‘content 
analysis’ methods and triangulated against information gleaned from the 
literature review and information available on the WebPages of key 
stakeholders.  
 
Limitations of the study include the “Howthorne” effect in which the 
participants responses are affected by the very fact that they are participants 
in a study and other potential sources of bias like interviewer bias. Other 
important limitations include the small sample size the lack of precoded 
questions, interviewer bias and the reliance on interviewees memories.  
 
Chapter 5 Results and discussion  
5.1 Introduction  
Chapter 4 outlined the data collection and analytical process that was 
undertaken. Interview data analyses used the ‘constant comparison’ and 
‘content analysis’ methods and was then triangulated with the literature review 
and information available on webpages of key stakeholders. Ideas that 
emerged were categorized and then summarized under the heading of public 
health need, stakeholder interests and partnership logic below.  
 
To reiterate the research objectives: they include firstly, understanding and 
describing the public health need for R&D into paediatric ARVs; secondly 
understanding and describing the various stakeholders and their respective 
interests; and finally exploring and indentifying potential collaborative / 
partnership opportunities that can be employed to address the existing public 
health need while satisfying the various stakeholder interests at play.  
5.2 Public health need  (Objective 1)  
In discussing the public health need with participants, the following categories 
emerged:  
1. The clinical imperative 
2. The moral imperative 
3. The need for innovation 
4. Product related problems 
5. Market related problems 
6. Public health systems related problems  
 
5.2.1 The Clinical imperative  
As highlighted in the literature review, treating children with ARVs is extremely 
effective in terms of increasing their quality and length of life. This fact was 
also highlighted by the clinical experts interviewed.  
 
5.2.2 The moral impetus  
Interviewees that work in the context of global public health initiatives made 
reference to the various commitments made by transnational agencies, 
multilateral institutions and individual governments. For details of these 
commitments, please see Appendix 3 below.  
 
5.2.3 The need for innovation 
Clinical experts interviewed highlighted the fact that for effective management 
of paediatric HIV/AIDS the major innovations that need to be either developed 
or made accessible in developing countries include:  
1. Novel treatments with improved effectiveness (especially in the light of 
drug resistant strains of HIV) 
2. Novel or augmented products that are suited to the developing 
countries environments (including heat stability, improved shelf life and 
decreased pill burden)  
3. New formulations that include 
a. Dose optimization 
b. Liquid formulations for very young or very sick patients  
c. Fixed dose combinations (FDCs) that improve adherence and 
contribute towards easier supply chain management 
   
It was noted that most ARVs are developed in the context of servicing rich 
country markets. For this reason, the highest ‘non-toxic’ doses are generally 
used in the formulations. Because of the high profit margins used in rich 
countries, the cost of at active ingredient in the drug represents a small 
contribution to the overall price of the product. This is not the case in poor 
countries as the reduced price often approximates the cost of the active 
ingredients. Lower dose formulations would therefore have a marked impact 
on the price and hence the availability of these products in Africa.  
 
A particularly important type of product was highlighted by the clinical experts 
interviewed, that is Fixed Dose Combinations (FDCs) which are products that 
contain more then one active ingredient and allow patients to take just one pill 
instead of a few pills at a time.  
 
5.2.4 Product related problems  
Specific problems outlined by clinical experts that were interviewed with 
regards to existing products included:  
1. D4t liquid formulation requires refrigeration and is therefore 
inappropriate in many high burden countries 
2. 3TC is only indicated for children over 3 months of age 
3. AZT has a low dose to volume ratio and is therefore needed in very 
high volumes in older children in order to get adequate doses 
4. NVP cannot be used in conjunction with rifampicin for children with TB 
due to drug-drug interactions that results in low blood concentration of 
NVP 
5. There is limited data available on the use of EFV in children less than 3 
years of age 
6. 2nd line treatment (used for treating children who have developed 
resistance to the 1st line treatment) is problematic as they need cold 
storage and there is no generic equivalents available.  
 
Given the fact that 40% of children requiring ARVs are less than 18 months, 
there is a need for the development of FDC for oral suspensions and 
solutions. Lack of paediatric labeling (particularly for infants) also represents a 
significant problem. In 2005, only 12 of the 20 ARVs were labeled for 
paediatric use and just 7 for children under 2. Lack of uniformity of distribution 
of active ingredients in adult pills means that breaking pills in half for 
paediatric use does not ensure accurate dosing in children.  
 
5.2.5 Market related problems 
Experts from industry highlighted the various market and regulatory related 
issues with respect to addressing the public health needs that exist in poor 
countries. These included:  
1. The demand for paediatric ARVs is likely to dwindle with time, 
especially in the light of the WHO, UNAIDS and UNICEF’s commitment 
to “virtual elimination” of Mother to Child Transmission (MTCT) by 
2015. Market incentives for pharmaceutical companies to invest in 
developing these products is therefore limited.  
2. Bioequivalence and pharmacokinetic studies in children are difficult 
and do not fall within the usual capabilities of generic companies (who 
are the most likely supply source of these products). Where FDCs for 
adults are changes to be appropriate for children, clinical trials need to 
be repeated to demonstrate efficacy in children.  
3. Children are growing and so need different doses over time. This 
means that the “product” (any particular formulation) does not have a 
long-term “consumer” for “continued use”.  
 
Almost all of the participants made reference to the fact that typical market 
incentives have not been adequate to drive R&D in the area of paediatric 
ARVs. Whether directly or indirectly, all of the interviewees talked about 
‘market failure’.  
 
Typically, markets work when the price and quantity sold/consumed of a 
product is a function of the intersection of supply and demand - or marginal 
cost and marginal benefit (see figure 2.1 above). For this mechanism to work 
however, a particular set of criteria need to be met: lots of buyers, lots of 
sellers, information efficiency, low barrier to entry into the market, low barriers 
to exit from the market, no externalities (costs or benefits incurred by a party 
not engaged in the commercial interaction), no public goods (non rival, non 
excludable goods).   
 
For many of these criteria, interviewees talked about reasons why they didn’t 
apply in this market. Patent protection provides a deliberate barrier to entry for 
new (small) companies, as does the complex regulatory environment 
associated with drug licensing. There are also very few buyers and sellers in 
the market for paediatric ARVs (as large agencies tend to do procurement on 
behalf a number of countries at once). Also, in the case of healthcare, both 
positive externalities and public goods are desirable. Appendix 5 below draws 
upon the literature review to lists some of the many reasons why there is an 
inherent ‘demand / supply’ mismatch in this area of the economy.  
 
However, even if markets could be used to set “price and quantity” for HIV 
commodities in poor countries, the capital budgeting process (described 
above) make engaging in R&D for these projects unattractive for many 
commercially driven entities.  
 
The most powerful mechanism that can be used to mitigate failure in the HIV 
commodity market is the establishment of partnerships that share costs, risks 
and benefits. As well as cost sharing and price concessions, other outcomes 
of these partnerships were talked about by participants, including the need 
for:  
1. Early engagement with supply chain and ensure transparency of 
business processes  
2. Clearly define requirements (demand) for supply side to respond to  
3. High level of flexibility with regards to commercial / contracting options  
4. Highly visible commitment to procurement  
5. High burden countries must evaluate local barriers to entry into their 
markets 
6. Governments must make use of flexibility in trade legislation to 
facilitate licensing 
7. Early submission of dossiers to WHO prequalification scheme  
8. Alignment of activities of buyers, suppliers and users  
9. Optimization of supply chain management to decrease inventory and 
operation costs and ensure quality assurance 
 
Participants highlighted the fact that without reliable demand forecasting and 
associated efficient global supply chain management, these markets will 
continue to be unattractive to commercial interests. Barriers to the global 
supply chain include:   
1. Uncertain political stability  
2. Lack of infrastructure 
3. Lack of critical market mass in certain countries 
4. High transaction costs due to slow adoption of e-business  
5. Poor information sharing and accurate demand forecasting  
6. Poor electron linkages to communicate and release supply requests 
and reports  
 
5.2.6 Public health systems related problems  
Policy experts interviewed made reference to the problems associated with 
scaling up paediatric HIV treatment in poor countries:  
1. Limited capacity in poor countries to scale up treatment programmes  
2. Lack of focus on HIV positive children by donor agencies and 
governments  
3. High cost of paediatric ARVs (50-90% higher then adult versions of 
branded products)  
 
5.3 Stakeholder interests (Objective 2) 
In discussing the issue of paediatric ARVs with interviewees, the participants 
were specifically asked to list important stakeholders that drive R&D for new 
products. Following reflection on the data, the following stakeholder map was 
drawn up.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Stakeholder map for R&D of HIV drugs 
 
Participants were asked to describe the various interests that the stakeholders 
identified might have and to discuss the decision making process that is 
undertaken when considering the R&D for paediatric ARVs.   
 
5.3.1 Branded companies 
Branded companies typically engage in R&D for new products that are usually 
intended for rich country markets. All interviewees agreed that branded 
pharmaceutical companies are arguable the easiest to understand in that they 
have a very clear mandate that is to maximize shareholder value.  
 
However as emphasized by those from the public sector, there are numerous 
non-fiscal benefits that can be attained by private sector companies engaged 
in the R&D for paediatric ARVs that include:  
1. Increased access to markets in poor countries for other products 
2. Improved public relations  
3. Access to new “platform” technology  
4. Risk sharing with public entities  
 
Branded and generic companies are likely to make decisions as to whether or 
not to engage in R&D for these products through a capital budgeting process 
(described below).  
 
5.3.2 Generic companies 
Generic companies typically market “off patent” products and so circumvent 
the high R&D costs associated with producing novel products. They are 
therefore often far better suited to engage markets in poor countries.  
 
Participants from pharmaceutical industry stated that generic companies are 
driven by the same set of decision-making processes as branded companies 
but are however constrained by the fact that they typically do not have in-
house research capabilities which are needed even for off patent products 
that are being reformulated and then licensed for paediatric use (as most 
ARVs are developed for adult use initially)  
 
5.3.3 Non-profit pharmaceutical companies  
One participant gave an anecdotal example of the Institute for One World 
Health that is a nonprofit pharmaceutical company that has 
1. In-house R&D capacity  
2. Tackles a wide variety of neglected diseases and select the best 
development opportunities available in each 
3. Is limited in the modality of treatment (drugs, vaccines and diagnostics 
can be developed as needed) 
 
Nonprofit pharmaceutical companies often adopt post-discovery compounds 
that have substantial safety and efficacy data but that have not been 
commercially developed by Branded companies (who either license or donate 
the intellectual property (IP)).  
 
It was pointed out that these companies represent an appropriate vehicle for 
the development of products from active ingredients that have proven efficacy 
but that have been abandoned by Branded companies due to a lack of 
anticipated profitability.  
 
5.3.4 Product Development Partnerships (PDPs) 
“Product development partnerships (PDPs) are a class of public–private 
partnerships that focus on pharmaceutical product development for diseases 
of the developing world. These include preventive medicines such as 
vaccines and microbicides, as well as treatments for otherwise neglected 
diseases. PDPs were first created in the 1990s to unite the public sector's 
commitment to international public goods for health with industry's intellectual 
property, expertise in product development, and marketing” (for a list of PDPs, 
see Appendix 4 below.  
 
The literature review highlighted important characteristics of PDPs that 
include the facts that they: 
1. Have small and effective management teams that coordinate project 
selection and portfolio management, low overheads and operational 
flexibility  
2. Disease specific focus  
3. Funding from public and philanthropic sectors with in-kind contributions 
from the private sector through project partnerships 
4. Funding of projects that have a commercial component to them as well 
as a well defined public health objective  
5. Decision-making typically lies with partnership management who have 
retroactive accountability to the Board and other stakeholders. This 
allows for project initiation, termination and adjustment without 
complicated and cumbersome approval mechanisms  
6. Clear recognition of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 
 
5.3.5 Social Venture Capital  
Interviews with participants lead to in-depth discussion on ‘social venture 
capital’ initiatives, many of which represent Public Private Partnership and are 
discussed in more detail in the section on ‘partnership logic’ below.  
 
Examples of Social Venture Capital (SVC) initiatives like International AIDS 
Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), the Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) and the 
Global Alliance for TB Drug Development (Global Alliance) were used as 
examples in discussion. Participants highlighted the fact that these initiatives 
finance projects in much the same way that a regular Venture Capital (VC) or 
Private Equity (PE) firm might, however, instead of requiring an equity share 
of the company, SVC initiatives negotiate obligations on the part of the 
companies that have strategic public health importance in developing 
countries. Generally these initiatives were considered by participants to be 
successful in terms of achieving their goals and were considered to be an 
important option for the future development of paediatric ARVs as they 
directly addressed the problem of failed ‘profit’ incentives for underserved 
markets.  
 
These venture were also referred to as Partnerships for Product Development 
(PPDs) and specific areas of success were described with regards to other 
areas of product development, in particular TB, Malaria and HIV vaccine. A 
list of successful PPDs was extracted from interview data and then 
complemented with examples found by searching the internet and revisiting 
the literature review performed (see Appendix 4 below).  
 
5.3.6 National programmes  
National HIV programmes within high-burden countries were identified as 
critical stakeholders for the development of paediatric ARVs. National 
programmes represent the interface between on the ground “need” and real 
market level “demand” as most HIV products are procured at this level. Two 
characteristic of HIV products were highlighted as important to national 
programmes, i.e. price and suitability (drugs for example that can be stored 
and transported at room temperature for areas that do not have ‘cold-chain’ 
capabilities). In terms of price, it was noted that tremendous efforts have been 
made by multilateral donor agencies like UNITAID and CHAI to impact the 
market dynamics and negotiate lower prices from both Branded and generic 
companies.  
 
It was also noted that an national programmes needed to ensure more robust 
‘demand forecasting’ (which will require more sophisticated health information 
systems) in order to make these markets more attractive to companies 
investing in R&D for paediatric ARVs.  
 
5.3.7 Multilateral donor agencies  
Interviews with senior management at UNITAID helped clarify their 
involvement in the R&D process. UNITAID is mandated to: 
1. Impact market dynamic for HIV, TB and malaria products to achieve 
lower prices 
2. Impact public health by increasing access to medicines.  
 
UNITAID currently works with partners (like UNICEF and the Clinton 
Foundation) by financing the bulk procurement of products in the hope that 
these partners can negotiate lower prices through increased buying power.  
 
Alternative strategies were talked about that included shifting the ‘supply 
curve’ to the right (see figures 6.1) by increasing competitiveness in the 
market and ensuring substitute products. This could be achieved by 
partnering with private sector companies to facilitate R&D through either risk 
sharing arrangements or providing Advanced Market Commitments (AMCs) 
for products that are currently in the R&D pipeline. 
 
5.3.8 The Medicines Patent Pool  
The Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) represents a new innovation in the area of 
facilitating access to medicines. Since the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the subsequent TRIPS agreement that governs 
Intellectual Property Rights, in-patent drugs have been made accessible to 
those living in poor countries through either ‘compulsory licensing’ (a provision 
within the TRIPS agreement that allows national governments to license 
products that are under patent in the face of a national health emergency) and 
voluntary licensing agreements with Branded companies. While this process 
has been effective in some countries, it represents prohibitive administrative 
burden on some poor countries that do not have the capacity to engage in 
these international legal proceedings for multiple drugs.  
 
The Medicines Patent Pool is a facility that allows participant companies to 
allow IPRs for lifesaving drugs to be ‘pooled’ in one facility that can be 
accessed by multiple countries without each of them needing to enter into 
negotiations with each company individually.  
 
In interviews with senior management at the MPP the importance of this 
facility in the context of R&D for paediatric ARVs was discussed. They 
highlighted the fact that new products are typically developed for rich country 
markets and that for these products to be made available in poor countries 
while under patent the regulatory issues that govern IPR need to be 
addressed in the most efficient way possible. They emphasize that R&D 
without facilitating access is largely a waste of time (from a public health 
perspective).  
 
5.3.9 Private sector Capital Budgeting  
In talking with representatives from the private sector, the importance of 
capital budgeting in the decision making process for companies was 
highlighted. Interestingly, it was felt that the public sector did not understand 
and did not engage with this process and that this represented a missed 
opportunity in terms of setting up meaningful collaborative and partnership 
initiatives between the public and private sector.  
 
Participants discussed the fact that the monetary costs associated with 
investing in R&D for HIV drugs are weighed against anticipated returns. 
Companies typically use capital budgeting methods like determining the Net 
Present Value (NPV) or the Internal Rate of Return to compare alternative 
investment opportunities and so make decisions as to the most optimal use of 
capital.   
 
The NPV is the current cumulative value of all future cash flows from a 
project, adjusted by a discount rate that is determined by the company. In the 
context of investing in drugs for developing countries, this ‘discount rate’ 
becomes particularly important. While companies typically use the Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital (WACC) that applies to the entire firm to discount 
future cash flows, the firm may choose a higher rate for projects that 
represent a higher risk than is typical for that firm’s activity. It is likely that 
pharmaceutical companies adjust their discount rate up when considering 
projects whose market is chiefly in developing countries where the market 
place is poorly characterized, demand forecasting is weak and political 
stability is uncertain.  
 
The IRR represents the interest rate at which the NPV of an investment would 
be zero. If the projects IRR exceeds the cost of capital, then the project may 
represent a desirable investment (depending of course on the IRR achievable 
via alternative uses of the same capital). Being a “rate”, the IRR is an 
indication of investment yield and not magnitude (as is the case with NPV).  
This fact is important in the context of investing in HIV related products as the 
sheer magnitude of revenues from alternative investment for products 
servicing rich countries would mostly dwarf those achievable from HIV 
products specifically made for poor countries.  
 
5.4 Partnership logic  (Objective 3)  
By considering the public health needs for new paediatric ARVs and the 
various interests of the respective stakeholders above, participants were 
asked about possible overlapping interests and mechanisms that can be (or 
have been) used to ensure a ‘win-win’ scenario in the area of R&D for these 
products.  
 
Buse and Harmer (2007) describe Global Health PPPs as collaborative 
relationships among pharmaceutical companies in partnership with UN-based 
organizations, developing country governments and public and private 
foundations to ensure efficient product development, healthcare delivery and 
technical support for implementation of national disease programmes  (Kent 
Buse & Harmer 2007).  
 
5.4.1 Public Private Partnerships  
Many of the participants interviewed either worked within an existing PPP or 
had a special interest in PPPs in the area of drug development. Much of the 
discussion revolved around the past successes and failures of PPPs in drug 
development.  
 
Partnerships are a mechanism through which many of the costs and risks (as 
well as the benefits) of engaging this market can be shared by the public and 
private sector.  
 
Social venture capital, donor agencies or governments are often prepared to 
engage directly with pharmaceutical companies and assume some of the up 
front financial burden associated with R&D for products that have strategic 
public health importance in exchange for price commitments or assurances 
that certain population groups will be serviced.  
 
5.4.2 Technology Transfer  
Lack of national capacity to domestically develop and produce drugs in poor 
countries was mentioned by a number of participants interviewed. Currently 
only 1/3 of sub-Saharan African countries have capacities for secondary 
manufacturing. Very often when they do have capacities, they are not in full 
GMPs (Dionisio et al. 2006). Important requirements in Africa alluded to 
include:  
1. Increased availability of trained human resources for quality 
manufacturing 
2. Greater depth of expertise in multilevel Standard Operating Procedures 
for quality manufacturing 
3. Higher levels of quality manufacturing and analytical technologies 
4. Improved local sourcing of raw or semi finished materials, with tariff 
barriers eliminated for importation 
5. Enhanced capabilities for local chemistry synthesis procedures 
6. Improved quality monitoring skills at National Drug Regulatory 
Authorities 
7. Greater government incentives  
8. Improved access to ample donor support  
 
Various UN resolutions, ratified my members states affirm a strong 
commitment by developed countries to promote and incentivize the transfer of 
technologies (particularly pharmaceutical) to developing counties so as to 
enable domestic production capabilities and so improve local access to life 
saving medications. See Appendix 6 for details of these resolutions.  
 
Effective technology transfer would: 
1. Improve national pharmaceutical policies 
2. Diminish the supply of and demand for counterfeit drugs. Foster 
scientific capacity 
3. Exert a positive impact on efforts to promote value added 
manufacturing activities 
4. Increase employment and education levels (see Appendix 7 for 
examples of technology transfer project). 
 5.4.3 Incentives  
Participants were specifically asked about mechanisms and incentives that 
can be (and have been) used to encourage R&D for products in 
underserviced markets. Responses included reference to:  
 Social venture capital arrangements (described above) 
 Advanced market commitments (whereby donor agencies promise to 
buy a product in the even that it is developed) 
 Health impact funds (a theoretical mechanism whereby the private 
sector would be paid for actual changes in health outcomes in a given 
population)  
 Reward mechanisms (whereby R&D efforts would be rewarded 
regardless of their success) 
 Fiscal and tax incentives    
 
5.5 Discussion 
Interviewees pointed firstly to the clinical effectiveness of ARVs when used in 
children and the fact that the life expectancy of children with HIV can be 
extended into adulthood. Various UN and donor agencies have subscribed to 
the ‘moral impetus’ to make ARVs available for children in poor countries 
(summarized in Appendix 3). While the ethical case for ensuring that children 
in the most vulnerable population groups be afforded life saving drugs is 
beyond the scope of this research, it is clear from the consensus within 
multilateral agencies (like the United Nations and World Health Organization) 
to which almost all nations subscribe, that if we are able to, we should do 
everything within our power to provide these children with treatment.  
 
The public health needs were categorized in this study under three headings: 
1) product related needs, 2) market related needs and 3) health systems 
related needs. Participants described the need for novel paediatric ARVs due 
to the emergency of HIV strains that are resistant to current drugs regimes. 
They also described the need for products that are appropriate to the context 
of low income countries like the need for heat stable formulations that don’t 
need transport refrigeration, low dose formulations that would be cheaper and 
Fixed Dose Combinations that would make transport and storage of products 
easier as well as decrease the pill burden for those taking the medicines. 
Liquid formulations and better tasting medicines for very young children was 
also highlighted as an important product related need.  
 
Having established the public health needs and the existence of a demand for 
paediatric ARVs, the participants in this study went on to discuss some of the 
reasons that current market mechanisms are failing to meet that need.  
 
Market related problems identified included a diminishing demand for 
paediatric ARVs, regulatory barriers and the fact that children (the end 
consumer) are growing and therefore need different products at different 
stages of their lives and so are not a ‘fixed market’. Market failure in the area 
of paediatric ARVs was discussed and the need for partnerships and 
collaborative initiatives to address this failure was highlighted. A list of 
reasons for the failure of market mechanisms in this area is summarized in 
Appendix 5 below. The importance of understanding the changing market 
demand for paediatric ARVs in the context of normative economic theory 
(described in Chapter 2) cannot be over emphasized. The price and quantity 
of ARVs used is a function of the intersection of supply and demand. The 
normative economic models described in chapter 2 suggest that the problem 
can be address by shifting the supply curve to the right by decreasing the 
marginal cost of production. This principle underpins the rational for engaging 
in innovative partnerships in which cost sharing enables this shift.  
 
It is essential that the interest of the various stakeholders (in both the public 
and private sector) be understood if partnerships are to be established to 
address the problem of R&D for paediatric ARVs. The data collected provides 
us with a detailed synopsis of these stakeholders and highlights some of the 
more pertinent incentives that drive these stakeholders. The various 
stakeholders were defined and included in a simple ‘stakeholder map’ (figure 
5.1). Each of the stakeholders and their respective interests were considered 
individually.  
Branded pharmaceutical companies are driven primarily by profit incentives 
and decisions about investment opportunities are subject to a capital 
budgeting process (like NPV or IRR). It was however pointed out that Branded 
companies are also influenced by non-fiscal incentives including: 1) corporate 
social responsibility, 2) access to new markets, 3) access to new platform 
technologies, 4) tax concessions, and 5) improved public relations.  
 
Generic companies typically manufacture off-patent medicines and so 
circumvent the high costs associated with R&D of novel products. They do 
however engage in the development of new formulations of old drugs 
(identified as an important public health need) and so represent an important 
set of players in this area. Generic companies however often lack the 
capabilities needed to engages the complex regulatory environment needed 
to register new products.  
 
There is a subset of pharmaceutical companies that are nonprofit and work 
with a strictly public health agenda. These include companies that do both 
primary research into novel products and development of new formulations of 
existing products. They also often enter into licensing agreements with 
Branded companies that allow them to access the Intellectual Property (IP) of 
products that Branded companies have chosen not to develop for low income 
countries.  
 
Partnerships for Product Development (PDPs) - a subset of PPPs - have been 
shown to be extremely effective in developing products for TB and malaria. 
The partnership is typically between a pharmaceutical company and a 
multilateral donor (like the Gates foundation) or a national government. When 
donor agencies engage in risk / cost sharing with the private sector (often in 
the context of a Social Venture Capital initiative) they usually provide finance 
or a procurement commitment in exchange for guaranteed price concessions 
in areas of strategic public health importance.  
 
Other structures like the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) and the WHO 
Prequalification Initiative have been put in place to ensure that Intellectual 
Property Rights can be easily accessed by low income countries and that 
regulatory hurdles can be easily overcome respectively.  
 
The importance of engaging with the capital budgeting process of the private 
sector was highlighted. As companies take ‘cost of capital’ into account when 
determining an interest rate against which future revenue is discounted (when 
calculating the NPV or IRR), it is in the interest of public institutions to 
facilitate a decreased cost of capital for these projects.  
 
The importance of partnerships in addressing both the public health needs 
and the stakeholder interests was emphasized by all of the study participants. 
As well as providing incentives to develop new products, these partnerships 
have other functions that include: improved demand forecasting, increased 
transparency, higher levels of commitment to procurement, improved 
engagement with the regulatory systems needed to register new products and 
improved supply chain management within countries.  
 
Partnerships are also an effective way to ensure ‘technology transfer’ from 
rich countries to poorer countries. Appendix 6 lists the various commitments 
made by UN agencies to increase technology transfer and Appendix 7 lists 
examples of successful technology transfer. In addition to increasing the 
technical capabilities in terms of drug development and production within less 
developed countries, technology transfer also helps improve: 1) human 
resource capabilities, 2) standard operating procedures, 3) quality of products 
produced, and 4) supply chain management.  
 
5.6 Summary  
This chapter reports and reflects on the data collected in this study. The 
analysis of the data enabled well defined categories of information to be 
established and provided a platform for discussion that connected the data 
collected to the normative economic and business theory described and 
literature review described above.  
 
The chapter starts by establishing both the clinical effectiveness of ARVs in 
terms increasing the life expectancy of children with HIV and the moral 
impetus to ensure access to these treatments that has been embraced by the 
international community at large.  
 
Having established the need for R&D in the area of paediatric ARVs, the 
study participants described the market related issues that impinge on the 
development of these products. Declining demand, prohibitive regulatory 
constraints, poor local supply chain management, weak demand forecasting 
and a lack of perceived returns on investment into R&D were the important 
issues cited.  
 
Participants were asked to identify the relevant stakeholders in the area of 
paediatric ARVs. A stakeholder map was drawn up that included: national 
health programmes, donor agencies, UN agencies, branded pharmaceutical 
companies, generic pharmaceutical companies, non profit manufactures, 
public private partnerships and public research organizations. The chapter 
describes each of these stakeholders and explores their respective interests 
and incentives so as to identify possible collaboration opportunities. 
Importantly, participants in the study highlighted the issue of capital budgeting 
and the decision making process that companies engage in when deciding 
between various investment opportunities. The importance of cost of capital 
was talked about and the lack of engagement by multilateral donor agencies 
in this area was pointed out.  
 
The role of existing public private partnerships and the mechanisms at play in 
terms of cost sharing were described as well the impact of technology transfer 
from developed to developing countries as mechanisms that can be (and 
have been) used to combat neglected diseases.  
 
The data collected, while addressing a number of issues, had at its core the 
theme of ‘incentives’. In order to engage in R&D for paediatric ARVs, the 
private sector needs to be provided with the right incentives that include cost 
sharing, market commitments and non-fiscal incentives like IP protection and 
access to platform technologies. The public sector by contrast need 
assurances that certain vulnerable populations will have access to the results 
of this kind of R&D and that prices for these populations will not be prohibitive. 
A number of innovative partnership / collaborative possibilities were described 
including: 
 Social venture capital arrangements 
 Advanced market commitments (whereby donor agencies promise to 
buy a product in the even that it is developed) 
 Health impact funds (a theoretical mechanism whereby the private 
sector would be paid for actual changes in health outcomes in a given 
population)  
 Reward mechanisms (whereby R&D efforts would be rewarded 
regardless of their success) 
 Fiscal and tax incentives    
 
Chapter 5 goes on to discuss these results and make the connections 
between the data collected and the normative economic models described in 
chapter 2 and information gathered in the literature review. The discussion 
laid out in chapter five provides a platform upon which the conclusions and 
recommendations presented in chapter 6 below are based.  
 
 
Chapter 6 Conclusions and recommendations  
6.1 Introduction  
Chapter 5 above presents the finding of the research conducted. Following 
reflection on the findings, this chapter presents conclusions that can be drawn 
and then goes on to make specific recommendations.  
6.2 Conclusions  
6.2.1 Public health need 
The need for new paediatric ARVs and more appropriate formulations of 
existing ARVs is apparent. Both the clinical and moral imperative for such 
innovations is universally accepted and the specific characteristic of needed 
products have been clearly delineated. Public health need however gets 
translated into market demand at a national health programme level as 
governments (often through multilateral agencies like UNICEF) do the bulk of 
the procurement of these products.  
 
Market incentives for industry to engage in the R&D for new paediatric 
products is limited and this problem is compounded by prohibitive regulatory 
constraints that need to be overcome in order for these products to be made 
available and hence meet the needs that exist at a national level. With current 
public health interventions aiming at the elimination of mother to child 
transmission of HIV, the market for paediatric ARVs is set to become 
significantly smaller over the next decade. This represents an additional 
disincentive to develop new products in this area. The market impact of 
changes in demand for new products is discussed in more detail in the section 
on ‘market dynamics’ below.  
 
6.2.2 Stakeholder incentives 
While multiple stakeholders have been indentified as important for the 
development of new products, these can broadly be classified in those that 
are part of the private and those that are part of the public sector. Private 
sector companies (including branded pharmaceutical companies, biotech 
companies and generics companies) each play a role in R&D and are chiefly 
driven by the need to maximize shareholder value.  
 
Branded companies typically develop products for rich countries but efforts 
are afoot (through initiatives like the Medicines Patent Pool) to ensure that 
despite existing patent protection, these products become available in poor 
countries too.  
 
Some products however need to be specifically developed for poor country 
markets (like low dose and heat stable formulations). Initiatives like Product 
Development Partnerships and Social Venture Capital projects have been 
specifically set up with a view to addressing these needs by establishing risk 
sharing partnerships with the private sector. The mechanisms that underpin 
these partnership is discussed in the ‘partnership logic’ section below.  
 
Government programmes and multilateral donor agencies (like UNITAID) are 
specifically geared up to engaging with the private sector to ensure lower 
prices of existing products and incentives to develop new products.  
 
6.2.3 Partnership logic 
Markets failure in the area of paediatric ARVs exists for a number of reasons, 
not least of which are high barriers to entry and a lack of a competitive 
environment. This is compounded by a lack in market incentives to engage in 
this area.  
 
Lessons learned from experience in similar markets (for TB, malaria and HIV 
vaccines) show that Product Development Partnerships represent a viable 
alternative to usual market mechanisms. These partnerships usually involve a 
donor agency, government or Social Venture Capital initiative assuming part 
of the financial risk associated with R&D or providing incentives through 
Advanced Market Commitments for new products. In exchange, industry 
typically makes pricing concessions for the products in areas of strategic 
public health interest.  
 
By providing incentives, sharing risk and more clearly characterizing the 
market (through more rigorous demand forecasting), it is likely that capital 
budgeting process undertaken by industry when examining these investment 
opportunities will assume a lower ‘cost of capital’ (or discount factor when 
calculating the NPV) and thus make developing these projects more attractive 
to them.  
 
A multilateral donor agency like UNITAID is well placed to provide funds for 
initiatives of this nature as they have an explicit mandate to impact market 
dynamics for products used to treat HIV, TB and malaria.  
 
6.2.4 Market dynamics 
Normative economic theory suggests that the price / quantity equilibrium in 
the market is a function of the intersection of supply and demand. This model 
can be used to help us understand what might happen with changes in R&D 
investment into paediatric ARVs.  
 
Strategic investment in new products would have the effect of creating 
substitutes for existing products and an increase in competitiveness in the 
marketplace that would in turn cause a ‘right shift’ in the supply curve in the 
market. Figure 6.1 below illustrates how, as the supply curve (marginal cost of 
production) is shifted to the right, the new equilibrium price / quantity is such 
that the market price is lower and the quantity consumed in the market is 
higher. From a public health perspective, this is a double win.   
 
 
Figure 6.1. Shift in the supply curve 
6.3 Recommendations  
This issue of investment in R&D for paediatric ARVs is important and 
represents an opportunity to save the lives of millions of children in poor 
countries. This report approaches the problem from a business science 
perspective and considers the market place from a demand and supply 
perspective.  
 
By understanding the need for paediatric ARVs and by delineating the 
interests of the various stakeholders that are involved with R&D, the report 
highlights the various complexities and barriers associated with the 
development of new products, not least of which is the poor financial 
incentives that exist for industry to engage in the development of these 
products.  
 
It is clear however, that possibilities for partnerships that address incentives 
and impact on the private sectors capital budgeting process exist. By making 
efforts to more clearly define the market through enhanced demand 
forecasting and by providing risk sharing opportunities with the public sector, 
this market can be made more attractive to drug developing organizations. 
Similar ventures have proven successful with respect to products for TB and 
malaria.  
 
UNITAID is an example of a donor agency with a mandate to impact market 
dynamics for HIV products however its current strategy is confined to 
negotiating lower prices through bulk purchasing of drugs. This report 
illustrates that other mechanisms could be used by UNITAID to encourage 
R&D for paediatric ARVs illustrated in figure 6.2 below.  
 
 
Figure 6.2. Possible financing mechanisms 
 
By providing funds as either an Advanced Market Commitment or Health 
Impact Fund, UNITAID could ensure that the market for these products is 
more attractive to industry. Furthermore, UNITAID could works directly with 
existing money markets (like venture capital or private equity companies) and 
provide security for investment in R&D for paediatric ARVs.  
 
Finally, UNITAID and other donor agencies should consider significant 
investment in health information systems in developing countries so as to 
improve demand forecasting and thus market characterization. By doing this, 
the return on investment in R&D for paediatric ARVs would be seen as a less 
risky venture for the private sector.  
6.4 Summary  
Reflecting on the results of this study, the author concludes that there is a 
pressing public health need for both new paediatric ARVs and new 
formulations of existing paediatric ARVS. The most effect way for this public 
health need to be addressed, however, is through proactively engaging the 
market dynamics that drive R&D for these products.  
 
Limited market incentives and prohibitive regulatory constraints represent the 
major barriers to investment in this area. Partnership opportunities exist 
however that could make the market for paediatric ARVs more attractive to 
industry through risk and cost sharing with the public sector. Success in the 
area of product development for TB and malaria suggest that these 
mechanisms are both viable and desirable.  
 
Initiatives whereby the public sector share in the R&D costs (by providing 
capital) and risks (by providing reward incentives and advanced market 
commitments) in exchange for price concessions in place of strategic public 
health importance could facilitate R&D in the area of paediatric ARVs.  
 
This report recommends that multilateral donor organizations (like UNITAID) 
engage directly with the pharmaceutical industry by creating a Health Impact 
Fund (that rewards industry for changes in health outcomes), Advanced 
Market Commitments (for products of strategic public health importance) and 
engages directly with venture capital firms by providing security for money 
provided to pharmaceutical companies that is invested in R&D for paediatric 
ARVs.  
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 8 Appendices  
Appendix 1 Letter to participants  
 
Dear [enter name]  
 
I am a medical doctor working for the World Health Organization / UNITAID 
and am currently doing a part time MBA degree through UNISA. As part of my 
course requirements, I am conducting research into “Collaborative and 
Partnership Opportunities in the Area of Research and Development for 
Paediatric Antiretroviral Drugs for Low Income Countries”.  
 
If you are agreeable, I would like to interview you for about half an hour with a 
view to collecting data for this research project. It will be a semi-structured 
interview that examines 1) the public health needs, 2) stakeholder interests 
and 3) partnership logic in this area. All interviews will be recorded and 
transcribed before analyzed and written up in a final report. Please find 
attached the interview protocol that will be used in this study.  
 
Please let me know if you are willing to participate and feel free to ask me any 
questions that might help clarify the research process being undertaken.  
 
Your sincerely,  
 
Dr Greg Martin  
Technical officer: WHO/UNITAID  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Appendix 2  Interview protocol  
All interviews in this study will be conducted with 1) informed consent of the 
participants, and 2) impartiality (that is to say, the interviewer will respect the 
thoughts and opinions of the participant and not try to influence the outcome 
of the study by prompting the interviewee with preformed answers) 
 
The interview process will include:  
1. A polite greeting. The participant will be thanked for his or her time 
2. A confirmation that the interviewee is willing to participate and 
understands the nature of the study 
3. A commitment to confidentiality. That is to say that while the 
information given will be described in the outcomes of the study, the 
information will not be attributed to a particular participant unless 
specific permission to do so is given 
4. The purpose and objectives of the study will be reiterated  
5. The participant will be given an opportunity to ask any questions about 
the study before the interview begins.  
6. The participant will be asked for confirmation of their permission to 
have the interview recorded and then transcribed.  
7. The participant will then be asked to address, in his or her own words, 
each of the study objectives in turn.  
8. The interviewee will ask questions that help him understand the 
comments made or for clarity on the issues raised 
9. The participant will be thanked for his time once again and asked if he 
or she has anything to add 
10. The interview will be transcribed and analyzed as per the study design 
protocol 
 
Appendix 3 Global commitment to addressing access to ARVs for children  
Commitments made by multilateral agencies and governments 
1. MDGs – Goal of a 2/3 reduction in mortality rate for children under 
the age of 5 
2. UNGASS declaration for commitment on HIV/AIDS – New 
resolution in Oct 2005 on universal access cals for governments to 
come “as close as possible to the goal of universal access to 
treatment by 2010 for all those who need it”  
3. UN General Assembly - A World Fit for Children – indentified HIV as 
one of 4 priority areas 
4. G8 Declaration issued at Gleneagles  - Universal access to ART for 
all by 2010 
5. UN Secretary General – “United for Children”: a campaign with 
UNICEF and UNAIDS called for access to treatment for 80% of HIV 
infected children by 2010 
6. MDGs – Goal of a 2/3 reduction in mortality rate for children under 
the age of 5 
 
Appendix 4 Product Development Partnerships 
International product development partnerships and public–private 
partnerships include: 
1. The Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi) was founded in 
2003 as a not-for-profit drug development organization focused on 
developing novel treatments for patients suffering from neglected 
diseases. 
2. Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation is a PDP dedicated to the 
development of effective tuberculosis (TB) vaccine regimens that will 
prevent TB in all age groups and will be affordable, available and 
adopted worldwide. 
3. FIND [1] is a Swiss-based non-profit organization established in 2003 to 
develop and roll out new and affordable diagnostic tests and other 
tools for poverty-related diseases. 
4. The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization is financed per 75% 
(750 Mio.US$) by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which has a 
permanent seat on its supervisory board. 
5. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria, a Geneva-based 
UN-connected organisation, was established in 2002 to dramatically 
scale up global financing of interventions against the three pandemics. 
6. The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), a biomedical public–
private product development partnership (PDP), was established in 
1996 to accelerate the development of a vaccine to prevent HIV 
infection and AIDS. IAVI is financially supported by governments, 
multilateral organizations, and major private-sector institutions and 
individuals. 
7. The International Partnership for Microbicides is a non-profit product 
development partnership (PDP), founded in 2002, dedicated to the 
development and availability of safe, effective microbicides for use by 
women in developing countries to prevent the sexual transmission of 
HIV. See also Microbicides for sexually transmitted diseases. 
8. Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) is a not-for-profit drug 
discovery, development and delivery organization, established as a 
Swiss foundation in 1999, based in Geneva. MMV is supported by a 
number of foundations, governments and other donors. 
9. The TB Alliance is financed by public agencies and private foundations, 
and partners with research institutes and private pharmaceutical 
companies to develop faster-acting, novel treatments for tuberculosis 
that are affordable and accessible to the developing world. 
10. A UN agency, the World Health Organization (WHO), is financed 
through the UN system by contributions from member states. In 
recent years, WHO's work has involved more collaboration with NGOs 
and the pharmaceutical industry, as well as with foundations such as 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Some of these collaborations may be considered global public–private 
partnerships (GPPPs); half of the WHO budget is financed by private 
foundations.  
11. The United Nations Foundation & Vodafone Foundation Technology 
Partnership, a five-year, $30 million commitment, leverages the power 
of mobile technology to support and strengthen humanitarian work 
worldwide. Partners include the World Health Organization (WHO), 
DataDyne, the mHealth Alliance, the World Food Program (WFP), 
Telecoms Sans Frontieres, and the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
 
Appendix 5 Mismatch between demand and supply of health services and 
medication  
Mismatch  Description  
Lack of information 
(patients) 
The HIV status of individuals may not be known.  HIV 
positive people or their caregivers may not know about 
the availability of treatment.  
Lack of information 
(clinicians) 
Paediatric ARVs have to be prescribed by a provider 
with some training. A lack of capacity may widen the 
gap between need and supply 
Lack of information 
(supply 
organizations)  
Poor demand forecasting and poor characterization of 
markets prevents supply companies from planning 
production  
Cost (to patient)  Even if ARVs are given free, associated costs my be 
prohibitive (and even catastrophic), e.g. user fees, 
testing costs, transport costs.  
Cost (to the system)  The “demand” for drugs is driven by managers who are 
not the end users (those with the “need”). There is 
therefore a mismatch between need and demand.   
Barriers to 
competition 
Complexity in R&D and regulatory issues makes it very 
difficult for new comers to enter into the market.  
Externalities  Some economists distinguish between “selfish” and 
“caring” externalities. Selfish externalities can affect 
demand, for example, in willingness to pay for a child’s 
care. Some people benefit from knowing that others 
are receiving care (caring externalities). This has 
implications for tax.  
Market incentives 
(profit)  
Industry and the market driving the supply of these 
drugs may be profit driven, hence even in the face of a 
given demand, they might not respond with supply if it 
does not represent a profitable scenario  
Non-market 
incentives 
(government 
provided services) 
Public programmes typically try to match need with 
supply. However, where patients have to demand 
service to receive it, ignoring demand and matching 
supply with “need” can lead to excess in supply, waste 
and eventual shortages.  
 
Appendix 6 UN and UN Agency resolutions pertaining to technology 
transfer 
Technology Transfer for local production of HIV related drugs in African 
countries:  
 
In April 2001, the 57
th
 session of the UN Commission on Human Rights 
adopted Resolution 2001/33, on “Access to Medication in the Context of 
Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS”.  The Commission calls upon States, at the 
international level, to take steps individually and or through international co-
cooperation, in accordance with applicable international law, including 
international agreements acceded to, such as to facilitate access in other 
countries to essential preventative, curative or palliative pharmaceuticals or 
medical technologies used to treat pandemics such as HIV/AIDS or the most 
common opportunistic infections that accompany them wherever possible, 
especially in times of emergency.  
 
On 21
st
 May 2001, the 54
th
 World Health Assembly in the resolution “Scaling 
Up the Response to HIV/AIDS” (WHA 54,10), recalled “efforts to make drugs 
available at lower prices for those in need” and urged Member States “in 
constructively in strengthening pharmaceutical policy and practices, including 
those applicable to generic drugs and intellectual property regimes, in order 
to promote innovation and the development of domestic industries 
consistent with national law” 
 
On 21
st
 May 2001, the 54
th
 World Health Assembly in the resolution “Scaling 
Up the Response to HIV/AIDS” (WHA 54,10), recalled “efforts to make drugs 
available at lower prices for those in need” and urged Member States “in 
constructively in strengthening pharmaceutical policy and practices, including 
those applicable to generic drugs and intellectual property regimes, in order 
to promote innovation and the development of domestic industries 
consistent with national law” 
 
The WTO DOHA Declaration reaffirms the commitment of developed 
countries to provide incentives to its industry for transfer of pharmaceutical 
technology to least developed countries.  
 
 
Appendix 7 Examples of technology transfer projects  
The Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Pharmakina (PK), originally owned by Boehringer Mannheim and Roche 
respectively, was taken over by the management of PK at the beginning of 
1999. PK is not only the largest private employer in Eastern Congo, but also 
the world largest produce of quinine. PK has put into operation a diagnostic 
centre for malaria, TB and pregnancy tests which is already open to the public. 
It also operates 12 Health Centres spread over other and South Kivu.  
 
The aim of this humanitarian project is to reduce the mobility and mortality of 
AIDS patients in Bukavu, Eastern Congo by offering cost effective diagnostics 
and low priced ARVS which are today’s best available choices for fix dosed 
combinations of stavudine, lamivudine and nevirapine and is taken as bi-daily 
tables. It is well tolerated in most cases, has few contra indications and is 
appropriate for use in women of child bearing age. It has proven efficacy 
under actual field conditions, is affordable and is easy to take.  
 
This is part of an on-going PPP in association with the German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ that will include the screening, counseling and 
therapy of patients. A total sum of around USD 1 million was invested.  
 
Action medeor works in close partnership with Pharmakina by providing 
treatment to a minimum of 50 to 100 patents and monitoring of 250 to 500 
patients. It has appointed a project manager who will be responsible for the 
implementation of anti-retroviral therapy. Laboratory has been equipped with 
flow cytometer and the training of personnel has been provided (Dionisio et 
al. 2006) 
 
Tanzania 
Tanzania Parmaceutical Industries (TPI), a pharmaceutical manufacturing 
company , 40% owned by government, 60% by private entrepreneurs, having 
its operations in Arusha has teamed up to manufacture artemisinin-based 
anti-malarial drugs at affordable prices. Because Tanzania is on of the 
countries hardest hit by HIV/AIDS, Tanzania has decided to start 
manufacturing life-prolonging drugs for AIDS patients. Since the country has 
an acute shortage of highly qualified technical and industrial pharmacists, TPI 
has entered into an agreement with experts from Thailand who have agreed 
to cooperate and transfer knowledge and know-how and all the necessary 
information to support the production of pharmaceutical and in particular 
anti-malarials, antiretrovirals, and anti-TB drugs.  
 
